Research

Why does support for mainstream parties decline? A growing literature points to economic loss as a source of political resentment. We bring this explanation one step further. We posit that the local economy qualifies the role of social capital in forging systemic support. When the economy thrives, social capital buffers discontent via interpersonal interactions. When the economy declines it exacerbates discontent, leading to a diffusion of grievances. We test our “networks of grievances” hypothesis in two settings. We first test our theory in Italy, which offers individual-level information together with fine-grained municipality-level social capital data. Second, we test the mechanism underlying our theory combining survey and local administrative data across 18 European countries. The results suggest that “networks of grievances” operate as channels of political discussions with peers, converting retrospective evaluations into systemic discontent bringing non-mainstream parties into voters’ choice sets.

What happens to peoples' social-policy preferences when their expectations concerning collective behavior are met, or even exceeded? And what conversely occurs when these expectations are unmet, and trust is thereby breached? Drawing on the first Italian COVID-19 lockdown as a massive exercise in collective action, this study tests how information on lockdown-compliance rates causally affects the social-policy preferences of Italian voters, conditional on their pretreatment levels of trust. Examining social-policy preferences across multiple dimensions, we find that trust is most closely linked to attitudes towards transfer generosity, as opposed to preferences on policy universalism and conditionality. Results highlight that neutral, fact-based information on cooperation levels can affect social-policy preferences—and that the direction of attitude change depends on whether one's trust has been met or breached.

Far-right scholars have focused extensively on the causes and consequences of far-right success, while not much attention has been directed towards what citizens and the civil society can do to tackle this phenomenon. Focusing on the surge of an anti-far-right social movement - the Sardine - during the 2020 Italian Regional Elections, we test whether grassroots mobilization is an effective tool to curb far-right parties’ electoral performance. Employing municipality-level data on electoral results, Sardine mobilization and far-right political events, we exploit a difference-in-differences design to identify the effect of local exposure to Sardine mobilization on the municipal electoral performance of far-right parties. The results suggest that local exposure to a Sardine event has a strong negative effect on far-right electoral results.

Are nostalgic authoritarian memories stigmatized? Far-right parties are increasingly successful in the EU, and some countries are even in a phase of democratic backsliding. While previous research would suggest that authoritarian experiences leave lasting marks of stigma, a warning against the authoritarian camp, we are witnessing the far-right parties succeed, even in democracies that experienced fascist rule. I address this puzzle by investigating the interaction between memory and politics, focusing on the (lack of) stigmatization of authoritarian nostalgia. I survey how Italians remember their fascist past, and whether memories favourable to the past dictatorship are stigmatized. Using an original survey and employing three different experimental strategies, I find that there is no stigmatization of authoritarian nostalgia. While doing that, I map Italy's views of its fascist past, measuring the memory of an authoritarian phase for the first time. The inability to stigmatize authoritarian nostalgia and the perceived divisiveness of the country's collective memory can help us understand how the success of far-right political actors was possible. The paper points out the importance of an inclusive democratic culture—and a shared collective memory—as a way of preventing a mainstreaming of nostalgic views of past authoritarian experiences. 

Previous research on attitudes towards inequalities and the demand for redistributive policies has produced conflicting results. Empirical evidence suggests that objective levels of inequality only influence attitudes when perceived as unfair. In this paper, I test how different types of information on economic inequality influence fairness perceptions. While previous research has viewed economic inequality as a unidimensional phenomenon, inequality is multidimensional, as reflected in the wide range of existing measures. Building on existing inequality measures, I examine how information on different dimensions of inequality influences fairness perceptions. Using a well-powered, pre-registered conjoint experiment, I identify the main dimensions explored in previous literature, replicate treatments, and add new ones. I provide a set of information based on real-life distributions of different dimensions of inequality across US states to provide realistic inequality profiles. I find that not all information on inequality influences fairness perceptions, however, information on the unequal distribution of resources does not have more or less effect than information on the unequal distribution of opportunities on fairness perceptions. Additionally, I find that partisan groups respond differently to different types of information on inequality. Overall, the findings contribute to a deeper understanding of how information on different economic inequality dimensions influences fairness perceptions.

Political actors frequently use historical depictions and narratives to increase support for policies and to mobilize voters. Recent studies are conflicted about the electoral consequences of inclusionary memory policy that increases the visibility of historically marginalized groups compared to majority groups. While some argue that such policies are effective in countering the rise of the radical right, others point to the risk of a political and cultural backlash. In our study, we shed light on this debate by investigating the effects of an official report that recommends the renaming of streets commemorating anti-Semitic figures in Berlin. First, we collect and combine highly fine-grained data on 9 elections with geocoded infrastructure data and estimate the electoral effects of street renamings using multiple difference-in-difference techniques. Second, we conduct a pre-registered survey experiment with a quota-based sample of Berlin residents to explore the mechanisms underlying the electoral effects. We find that the street renaming initiative decreased the vote share of the center-right by one percentage point in districts where renamings have been proposed. This effect is driven by a negative emotional response, guilt, and increased support for inclusionary memory policies that move voters away from the policy positions of right-wing parties. Our findings strongly speak against the backlash hypothesis. Instead, opposition to inclusionary memory policies can move voters away from right-wing parties and decrease their electoral fortunes.

Cultural issues have gained importance in contemporary political debates. Even symbolic issues that have no distributive consequence appear of pivotal importance in electoral campaigns. In this paper, we examine how voters respond to progressive politics by testing reactions to gender-inclusive language (GIL), a linguistic form that embraces all gender identities. Drawing on two complementary research designs—an observational study based on social media data and two vignette experiments—we assess voters’ affective and threat responses to GIL in Germany. Our analysis reveals that on social media, GIL generates an emotionally polarizing effect, eliciting both positive and negative reactions. In contrast, experimental evidence indicates that GIL predominantly triggers a backlash, increasing negative emotions and perceptions of threat from social change. This backlash is especially pronounced when minority candidates employ GIL and is most evident among historically privileged individuals, particularly lower- and middle-income males. Overall, our study contributes to a deeper understanding of the complex interplay between symbolic political communication and voter behavior, offering valuable insights for both political practitioners and scholars.

Political trust is essential for the cohesion and survival of democratic societies. Yet, recent trends indicate a decline in trust towards representative institutions, coinciding with the rise of anti-establishment movements across the Western world. This paper explores the early origin of adult political trust, focusing on the role of economic hardship during adolescence. We hypothesize that exposure to economic hardship, specifically unemployment, in youth, leaves a lasting imprint on political trust. Using Danish surveys and administrative data, we investigate how exposure to unemployment during adolescence influences political trust later in life. Our findings reveal significant and robust negative effects of unemployment on political trust, both across neighborhood and school contexts. Further, we show that unemployment exerts a distinct, and more pronounced, and lasting impact on adult political trust compared to merely living in low-income or high-inequality areas. This research underscores the critical role of early economic experiences in shaping political attitudes, emphasizing the importance of providing employment opportunities to foster trust in politics over the long term. Additionally, our study highlights the influence of local environments and community influence in the formative years, such as schools and neighborhoods, in leaving lasting imprints on political beliefs. Overall, this paper contributes to the understanding of political trust dynamics, illuminating the enduring effects of economic circumstances in youth on political trust. 

A growing body of research highlights the role of nostalgia as a form of symbolic rhetoric that resonates with voters in contemporary democracies. While the use of nostalgic appeals by populist and radical right parties is well documented—along with its connection to radical right attitudes and vote choices—the mechanisms through which nostalgic rhetoric shapes voter perceptions remain underexplored. In particular, we know little about how nostalgic language influences political judgment independently of a candidate’s substantive policy platform or partisan affiliation. This paper addresses that gap through an original survey experiment conducted in Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom. Our experimental design isolates the causal effect of nostalgic rhetoric on voter perceptions of a candidate's ideological positioning and group representation. We find that nostalgic rhetoric affects voter perceptions in two important ways. First, it increases the likelihood that candidates are seen as aligned with culturally conservative values, and, to a lesser extent, as supporting economically redistributive policies. Second, it strengthens perceptions that candidates represent lower social classes, “the people,” and individuals “like me.” These findings demonstrate that nostalgia serves as an efficient heuristic through which voters interpret political candidates’ worldviews, even in the absence of explicit programmatic content. By shifting attention from the supply and correlates of nostalgic sentiment to its perceptual effects, our study offers a theoretically grounded and empirically robust account of why nostalgia is a powerful, and frequently employed, tool in contemporary political communication.

Nostalgia has long been a powerful tool in political campaigns, and it plays a central role in today’s far-right and populist rhetoric—from calls to “make America great again” to the Brexit campaign’s promise to “take back control.” This research note examines how nostalgic rhetoric shapes voter support, particularly among groups often seen as the core base of far right and anti-establishment success. Existing research suggests that older voters and socially or economically “left-behind” groups are most responsive to nostalgic messaging, but it does not provide strong evidence of such links. While prior research suggests that older and economically “left-behind” voters are especially receptive to nostalgic appeals, direct evidence for this claim is limited. Nostalgic messaging is frequently intertwined with specific ideological positions and policy issues, making it difficult to isolate its unique effects. To address this gap, we conduct a survey experiment in three European countries, manipulating the presence of nostalgic language in political statements. The results show that nostalgia does not specifically mobilize older or economically disadvantaged voters. Instead, it resonates most strongly with voters who are already ideologically conservative, offering far-right parties a rhetorical edge over more moderate right-wing competitors. Rather than serving as a catch-all appeal to the disaffected, nostalgic rhetoric is best understood as a targeted strategy for consolidating conservative support.

The paper builds on the puzzling re-emergence of far-right parties in Italy, a country where the fascist experience is recent and violent. It tries to shed some light on this puzzling phenomena by looking at the phenomenon from an original perspective, focusing on the determinants and implications of authoritarian nostalgia. I collected new survey data to better understand how widespread authoritarian nostalgia is, to understand the main determinants, and whether it is a consequential phenomena.